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COPYRIGHT REVISION: PREEMPTION
AS A PANACEA*
The present United States Copyright Law has not been substan-
tially changed since its initial enactment in 1909. As a result, the
Copyright Office has studied the major problem areas over a period
of ten years, and has recommended a comprehensive bill1 to revise
title 17 of the United States Code.
One of the highlights of the current bill is section 3012 which
preempts common law copyright and makes those works protected
under the common law subject to protection under title 17. In order
to assess the effects of preemption it is necessary to review the dis-
tinctions between common law and statutory copyright, examine the
revision program, and analyze section 301.
BAsIC DISTINCTIONs BETWEEN COMMON LAW
AND STATUTORY COPYRIGHT
At common law an intellectual creation is an absolute and in-
corporeal property right which is governed by the same rules that
govern personal property.' Copyright secured by title 17 is also
incorporeal,4 but the exclusive rights are enumerated in the statute
and limited, subject to judicial gloss, to the right to make other ver-
* This comment has been entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
2 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1965):
(a) On and after January 1, 1967, all rights in the nature of copyright in works
that come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,
whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to copyright, literary
property rights, or any equivalent legal or equitable right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the law of
any State with respect to:
(1) unpublished material that does not come within the subject matter
of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103;
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before
January 1, 1967;
(3) activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106,
including breaches of contract, breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, defama-
tion, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false representation.
8 Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935);
Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872); Drone, Copyright 104 (1879).
4 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
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sions of and to copy, vend, print, publish, record, and perform the
copyrighted work.5
A common law copyright will not vest until an original work is
created and developed beyond an abstract idea.6 Statutory copyright
also requires originality but exacts a higher standard of concreteness;
the work must qualify as a writing.7 It therefore is apparent that the
scope of protection is greater at common law.8 Statutory copyright has
one basic requirement that distinguishes it from common law copy-
right: the former requires a publication9 whereas the latter, though
attaching immediately upon creation of the work,"0 is lost upon pub-
lication. Also, there are certain formalities which must be complied
with before statutory copyright is vested: the work must be published
with notice of copyright" or there must be registration and deposit
of specified unpublished works.'"
One principal difference between the two forms of protection is
that at common law the author has a perpetual right to prevent an
unauthorized use as long as the work is unpublished," while under the
statute the right is limited to a specific term of years. 4
THE COPYRIGHT REVISION
The primary aim of preemption is to eliminate the concept of
publication which is the dividing line between statutory and common
law copyright. Publication, which is traditionally defined as making
copies "unconditionally available to the public at large,"'" has become
5 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). Merely because the statutory rights have been enumerated
does not mean that the corresponding protection will be interstitial in form. On the con-
trary, it has been asserted that any use of literary property which has some value is
apparently protected by the statute and in that sense the common law and statutory
copyright would be equivalent in their protection of rights under most circumstances.
Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 5S (1944). But see Nimmer, Copy-
right § 111 (1964).
6 Nimmer, Copyright § 11.2 (1964).
7 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
8 Nimmer, Copyright § 111 (1964). The most patent examples of this are records
which cannot be copyrighted since they are not writings within the meaning of the
statute, but which are afforded protection by the common law copyright. Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
0 Nimmer, Copyright § 11.2 (1964).
10 Well, Copyright Law 117 (1917).
11 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
1 17 US.C. § 12 (1964).
13 Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US. (8 Pet.)
591 (1834) ; Wel, op. cit. supra note 10, at 109.
14 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1947).
1 Register of Copyrights, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., Copyright Law Revision Report
pt. 6, at 81 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Report].
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obsolete due to the revolution in communications. 6 The public dissemi-
nation of records'7 and the performance of a work before several mil-
lion people on television does not result in publication, but the sale
of a single copy can prohibit common law protection and make the
work subject to the federal copyright statute.' Since common law
protection continues until there is a publication, these works which
avoided the traditional definition of publication could reap commercial
benefits in perpetuity. It was this perpetual right of the common law
owner which confficted with the policy of the "limited times" provision
of article one, section eight of the Constitution and prompted the
revision program. 19
The impetus for revision of the present dual system began with the
Strauss Study of 195720 which recommended three alternative revisions
of the copyright statute. The first proposal recommended that the
privilege of registering under the copyright statute be extended to all
unpublished works.2 ' The study secondly recommended a redefinition
of publication to include public dissemination and thereby remove the
common law protection afforded a recorded work after it had been sold
or a play after it had been publicly performed. The third alternative
suggested the preemption of common law protection by making the
statute applicable to all works and, as a result, avoid altogether the
concept of publication.
The recommendation of the Copyright Office was a combination
of the first and second proposals which would extend the privilege of
registration under statutory copyright to all unpublished works and
terminate the common law protection when the work is publicly dis-
seminated.s The preemption of all common law rights was felt to be
undesirable for the reason that private papers would fall into the public
domain after the fixed statutory time limit expired and "the right of
privacy should be paramount in this situation."23 A further reason for
avoiding preemption was that the change would involve exclusive
16 Ibid.
17 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
18 1965 Report 81.
19 Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision Report
pt. 1, at 39-40 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Report].
20 Strauss, "Protection of Unpublished Works," Copyright Law Revision Study
No. 29 (1957).
21 Presently, only a limited class of unpublished works can be protected under the
statute. Examples of this class are lectures, motion pictures, and dramatic and musical
compositions which are usually performed or exhibited before being published in the
form of copies. Id. at 7.
22 1961 Report 41.
23 Ibid.
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federal jurisdiction over undisseminated works which are ordinarily a
matter of private and local concern and should not require the atten-
tion of a federal court. 4
One argument in favor of preemption is that under the present
dual system, the courts in enforcing a particular common law right
may reach anomalous results.2 5 With the electronic era and its simul-
taneous broadcasts, infringement may result in many states and the
remedy may consequently differ depending on where the suit is
brought." The goal of achieving uniformity in result necessitates the
establishment of a single system to administer the many facets of
copyright. In rebuttal to the argument that the federal courts will be
overwhelmed with small cases or cases primarily of local concern as
a result of preemption, the state courts could be given concurrent juris-
diction over private matters but the federal law would remain decisive
of all legal questions.2
7
Another argument in favor of preemption which neutralizes the
privacy contention relates to the interest of scholars, historians, and
the general public in unpublished works.28 The Copyright Office pro-
posed a provision which would have limited the duration of rights in
unpublished manuscripts placed in libraries,2 but this compromise with
total preemption appeared to be inadequate since the vast amount of
scholarly papers may never be placed in a library. The remedy of self-
help is probably the most persuasive argument against the invasion of
privacy: if the materials are especially sensitive, the author or his heirs
can destroy the writings rather than have them disclosed at the end of
the statutory period."0
The commentators were in favor of the more rigorous preemption
because the advantages of a uniform system outweighed the need for
the preservation of common law rights.31 Further, administration of
a new concept of public dissemination raised numerous difficulties32
The Copyright Office, therefore, withdrew its prior compromise and
24 Id. at 42.
25 Sargoy, "An Exclusive Federal Statutory System for Literary and Artistic Works:
The Confusions in the Diversity of our Present Federal and State Systems," 8 Bulletin
of the Copyright Society 6, 8 (1960).
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 19.
28 Strauss, supra note 20, at 33.
29 1961 Report 41-42.
30 Strauss, supra note 20, at 33.
31 Register of Copyrights, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Copyright Law Revision Report
pt. 4, at 2 (Comm. Print 1964).
32 1965 Report 83.
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submitted the recommendation for preemption which is embodied in
the current bill.83
THE BmL
The purpose of section 301 is to "preempt and abolish any rights
under State law (whether common law or statutory) that are equivalent
to copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope of the
copyright law."34The scope of this preemption is limited by section 301
to "works that come within the subject matter of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103." The test under section 102"5 is whether or
not the work is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." This
"medium of fixation is irrelevant as long as it is tangible enough for
the work to be perceived or made perceptible to the human senses,
directly or with the aid of any machine or device 'now known or later
developed.' I'll Therefore, "the pre-emptive effect of section 301 is
not intended to extend to unfixed works such as, for example, a piece
of choreography that has never been notated or filmed, an impromptu
speech, or a musical composition that has been performed from memory
but never written down or recorded. These would continue to be pro-
tected indefinitely at common law until fixed in some form .... ."'
The stated purpose of section 102 is to cover only those "classes
of works that are copyrightable under the present law, to designate
pantomimes and choreographic works as a specific category, and to
add the new category of 'sound recordings.' " The language of the
33 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1965). See supra note 2 for the
text of the section.
34 1965 Report 83.
35 The text of § 102 follows:
Subject matter of copyright: In general
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures;
(7) sound recordings.
Section 103 concerns compilations and derivative works and is not relevant to this
discussion.
36 1965 Report 4.
37 Id. at 84.
38 Id. at S.
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bill, however, requires only an original work of authorship and fixation
in a tangible medium of expression; furthermore, the enumerated
categories of section 102 are illustrative and do not limit the categories
according to the definition of the term "including" in section 101. It
appears that the language of the section has a broader scope than the
stated purpose. The courts will probably construe the enumerated
categories as a limitation on the introductory clause of section 102. 9
With such a limitation, section 102 amounts to nothing more than a re-
enactment of the prior law with the additional inclusion of sound re-
cordings.40
Section 102 (5), which includes "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works," is intended to codify the result in Mazer v. Stein4l and permit
one to copyright a work which is to be employed as a design or decora-
tion of a useful article but to exclude the useful article as such from
copyright protection.' As a result, a painting of a flower used on a
dress can be copyrighted but the dress itself cannot be protected.4 3
Other types of works which do not fall within section 102 and could be
protected at common law are typography, industrial designs, and
broadcast emissions.4
Works which come within the subject matter of copyright are
totally preempted even though the work is minimal or lacking in origi-
nality.43 This could result in a work being uncopyrightable under the
statute and also being preempted from any possible common law
protection.
Not only must the particular work fall within the subject matter
of section 102 to be preempted, but the rights which are at issue must
be in the nature of copyright. This follows from section 301(b) (3)
which permits a cause of action in a state court for the violation of a
right if such a right is not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
enumerated in section 106.46 Sections 107 through 114 provide certain
limitations, qualifications, and exceptions to the exclusive rights of
39 The categories of the current law, 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1964), have been construed as
limits on the statutory term "writings." 1961 Report 10-11.
40 This limitation is consistent with the purpose of excluding industrial designs,
typography, and broadcast emissions which would appear to be subject to protection
under the broad language of § 102. See 1965 Report 3.
41 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
42 1961 Report 13-14.
43 Id. at 14. The concept of "useful article" also serves to prevent the copyright of
designs of functional architectural structures. Id. at 15-16.
44 1965 Report 3.
45 Id. at 84.
46 Section 106 permits the owner of the copyright to reproduce, record, adapt,
publish, perform, and exhibit.
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section 106, but if a particular right falls within one of the exceptions
it cannot be protected at common law because it would still be within
the general scope of section 106. For example, section 112(b) limits
the exclusive right of reproduction of a sound recording to total dupli-
cation. Under this section if a record pirate appropriated the recording
with minor changes, he would not be liable under the statute because
the record was not duplicated. He would not be liable under common
law copyright since it is preempted by the inclusion of sound recordings
within the subject matter of section 102, nor would he be liable under
the common law remedy of unfair competition since the appropriation
is equivalent to the exclusive right of reproduction under section
106(a) (1).
If, however, the objectionable behavior was not a misappropriation
of the work product but rather a "passing off" of a record as though it
were the plaintiff's, then a traditional cause of action for unfair com-
petition has been stated and the right violated is not equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within section 106. Under section 301(b) (3)
this cause of action is not preempted and the state can provide pro-
tection. 47
To further illustrate this dual criteria of preemption, i.e., subject
matter and equivalent rights, assume the following hypothetical: B
has developed a dress design and C, a style pirate, has copied the design
and is using it in a competitive garment. The state law has both a
copyright and an unfair competition statute which would give B pro-
tection under these facts. Under section 301(a) the state law is not
preempted because a dress design is a work of utility and is not within
the subject matter of copyright. This is true even though the activities
in question deal with the right to copy or reproduce which is a right
in the nature of copyright. If the dress design is unpublished then the
state copyright law could protect it by virtue of section 301(b) (1).
If, however, the garment is marketed and, therefore, published, does
it lose its common law protection? The Copyright Office states that
the "word 'unpublished' was therefore added to [section 301(b) (1)]
... to avoid any implication that common law protection equivalent
to copyright, for material not coming within the subject matter of the
statute, might continue after its publication.1 4
Section 301(b) (1) is drafted in a negative manner as a proviso,
exception, or savings clause to section 301 (a) and does not prohibit
protection after publication unless the word "unpublished" is con-
strued in its negative implications. If it were construed in this manner




then subsection (b) would be an extension of the preemptive effect
of subsection (a). From the language of the bill this would be an
awkward interpretation and it is arguable that our dress design,
which is not within the subject matter of copyright, can be protected
by the common law after publication.
The dictate against protecting a work by common law copyright
after it is published appears to be derived from the previous case
authority and not from the bill itself. Conceding that this would be a
permissible interpretation of the bill, the question is, who can determine
when a work is published?
The bill under section 101 defines publication as "the distribution
of copies ... to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership ......
Does this definition apply to a work which is not preempted by section
301 (a)? The Copyright Office asserts that the definition is applicable49
but under the Capitol Records case5" it is arguable that the state law
definition should be determinative. Although Congress certainly has the
power to define when publication occurs for the common law copyright,
the question is whether it has done so under section 301. It is sub-
mitted that the language of the bill only preempts state law in its defi-
nition of unpublished works in a negative fashion and that a per-
missible interpretation of the bill would allow the states to regulate
and define their own concepts of publication in such a way that the
sale of a dress would not be a publication of the design.5
The common law remedy of unfair competition is not prohibited
by the bill even if the work is published, but "to the extent that a right
against 'unfair competition' is merely copyright by another name,
section 301 is intended to abolish it as a common law cause of ac-
tion."52 One possible construction of this statement might be that the
work must fall within the subject matter of section 102 before the
unfair-competition remedy is precluded. In that situation it would be
clear that the remedy is prohibited because the requirements of section
301 (a), i.e., subject matter and equivalent rights, have been met.
With our dress design the requirement of subject matter is not
present and so how can the bill itself preempt this state remedy? Sub-
section (b) (3) certainly should not be construed as an extension of
the preemptive effect of subsection (a). The dictate against conferring
equivalent rights must, as in the case of the published work, come from
49 Ibid.
0 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., supra note 8.
51 The states have molded their common law remedies to give protection to certain
"uncopyrightables." Note, "Copyright Protection for Uncopyrightables: The Common-
Law Doctrines," 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 699 (1960).
52 1965 Report 85.
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previous judicial authority such as the Supreme Court's decisions in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,"8 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. 4 In those cases the Court held that a design, which could
not be patented because it lacked invention, could not be protected
against copying by the state's unfair competition law because this
would encroach on the federal patent system. The Court held that the
state remedy was preempted, but the state's power "to impose liability
upon those who.., deceive the public by palming off their copies as
the original" was left intact.5 5 The test under these cases was
whether Congress could have protected the works, for if it could, then
Congressional silence is enough to preempt the area. The analogy of
a copyright to a patent is inescapable and under this test if the work
would qualify as a writing under article one, section eight of the Con-
stitution, then Congress has authority to protect it, and if it chooses
not to do so, the states will not be permitted to confer equivalent
rights. Since our dress design has been published and Congress has
decided not to confer protection, the states may not use their remedy
of unfair competition to protect the designer from mere misappropri-
ation because that is a right in the nature of copyright.
It would seem that a redrafting of section 301, omitting the cri-
terion of subject matter in subsection (a), would resolve many of these
problems by making explicit what now remains implicit. The following
simplified draft is submitted: "On and after January 1, 1967, all rights
in the nature of copyright are governed exclusively by this title."
Section 301 (b) should then be set forth as it now exists. This redrafting
would eliminate the criterion of subject matter and would make equiva-
lent rights the sole test of preemption. The criterion of subject matter
would, however, reenter the interpretive scheme in the proviso of sec-
tion 301 (b)(1). This would make section 301(b) truly a savings pro-
vision rather than a negative extension of preemption and this result
seems to coincide more exactly with the purpose of preemption. The
other language in the statutory proposal appears to be surplusage
since the results are implied from the preemptive clause, and for pur-
poses of clarity and conciseness, it should be eliminated from the draft.
Although the results achieved under this submitted draft should
be equivalent to the expected interpretation of the new bill, the change
would simplify the language and would not leave to inference the defi-
nition of publication or require reliance on case authority prior to
enactment.
53 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
54 376 U.S. 234 (1964).





The invasion of privacy was the primary concern of the Copyright
Office in its original recommendation for revision."0 The privacy issue
was inserted because unpublished works such as diaries, letters, manu-
scripts and other personal material would go into the public domain
at the end of the statutory term. Under the current bill, i.e., sections
302 and 303, the statutory term has been lengthened to the life of the
author plus fifty years and the Copyright Office believes that "the
terms provided in those sections are long enough to avoid any questions
of invasion of privacy."5 7 Even if this duration does not eliminate all
privacy contentions, section 301(b) (3) expressly permits a cause of
action for invasion of privacy as long as it is not equivalent to any of
the rights of copyright. This action at common law should be valid
after the elapse of the statutory term.
One of the arguments against revision was that the federal courts
would be swamped with cases primarily of local concern; this argument
is still valid since the bill does not provide for concurrent jurisdiction
with the state courts. This, however, is only an illusory fear since the
scarcity of opinions suggests few cases of this nature are ever litigated.
Furthermore, the purpose of the preemption is to provide uniformity
and this is best served by allowing federal courts, which have a measure
of expertise in the area of copyright, to decide these cases.
Statutory Limitations
One of the considerations leading to preemption was the absence
of any limitations on the common law copyright. Statutory copyright
is circumscribed by the limitations of fair use, for profit, and com-
pulsory license, but these do not apply to common law copyright 8
which prohibits any unauthorized use of the unpublished work. 9 There
is one patent exception to the exclusive use of common law copyright:
the test of substantial similarity which is used to establish the act of
copying. This test, which has been held to apply to common law copy-
right, as well as statutory copyright, necessarily permits a certain
amount of copying which does not amount to an infringement.60
50 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
57 1965 Report 86.
58 1961 Report 40.
59 Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
60 Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930); Malkin v. Dubinsky,
25 Misc. 2d 460, 203 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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Fair Use
Although there are many conflicting theories on the application
of fair use, Nimmer summarizes the defense as applicable where the
use of the infringing work does not adversely affect the value of any
rights in the copyrighted work by competing with it for a market.6
Although the authority is either extrajudicial or dictum, the consensus
is that the defense is unavailable for common law copyright infringe-
ment.62 But even if the defense does not apply, the issue would be moot
in certain situations. For example, if the use does not adversely affect
the value of any of the rights in the unpublished work, and the pirate
has not made a profit, as in a private reading of an unpublished poem,
then the owner has suffered no damages and should not recover unless
he can prove the malicious intent required for punitive damages.63 In
this situation the result is the same: either the defense is recognized
or there is no remedy provided.
The preemption of common law copyright will necessarily make
unpublished works subject to the defense of fair use which will be
codified under proposed section 107. The question is whether this is
desirable from a policy standpoint. The limitation of fair use is a nec-
essary compromise between public needs and the limited monopoly
accorded the statutory owner. Since the statutory owner is actively ex-
ploiting his work on the available markets, permitting public criticism,
comment, and scholarship to have a free ride is a fair price for such
a commercial monopoly. If this limitation is applied in toto to the
common law copyright, fair use may be the only use for certain types
of works such as diaries, letters, and manuscripts. The author may not
be engaged in exploitation of the work and if scholarship piracy is per-
mitted, the author will not recoup his quid pro quo which is normally
the case with the statutory copyright owner. If the work is being dis-
seminated, then, of course, the same criteria should apply to the un-
published work as is applied to the published work since the author has
voluntarily relinquished his work product. The one redeeming provi-
sion that neutralizes the objections to the fair use of common law copy-
right is the preservation of the cause of action for invasion of privacy
61 Nimmer, Copyright § 145 (1964).
62 In Golding v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 193 P.2d 153, 163 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1948) the court said in dictum that "the privilege of 'fair use' accorded in statutory
copyright cases is not accorded by the common law in the case of unpublished works and
the author has exclusive control of his work." Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35
Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950), also in dictum rejected the defense of fair use for
common law copyright. Weil, Copyright Law 117 (1917), said the author "has, probably,
the right to prevent even a 'fair use' of the work by others against his consent."
63 See Nimmer, Copyright § 143 (1964).
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under section 301(b) (3). This provision gives the author a right of
action against any- appropriator even though the taking is rationalized
by fair use. It further strikes a nice equilibrium between scholarship
and the privacy of the creator by eliminating objections founded solely
on an absolute property right. The test is whether a personal rather
than a property right was invaded and this, it is submitted, is a fair
compromise.
Public and for Profit
To constitute an infringement of a musical or nondramatic literary
work which is copyrighted by statute, the performance must be public
and for profit.04 But the application of these limitations to the common
law copyright would be prohibited since such a copyright is absolute
and exclusive." Even if the public limitation does not apply to the
common law copyright, the extent of damages for a nonpublic in-
fringement would be very small, assuming the owner has possession
of the work. Private use of the work should not impair the value of
any right and in that sense the common law perfects its own public
limitation by manipulating the damage remedy. This rationale is in-
applicable to the "for profit" limitation since a complete appropriation
of the work can be made for nonprofit uses and the value of the work
can be completely impaired. The public and "for profit" limitations will
apply to common law copyright after preemption,66 and there may be
situations where the privacy of the creator is not protected. If a neigh-
bor surreptitiously reads the author's diary then there is no infringe-
ment of the owner's copyright because the activity is not public.
Furthermore, the owner cannot take advantage of the remedy for in-
vasion of privacy which is saved by section 301(b) (3) for there must
be a public disclosure of private facts to perfect a cause of action,"
and the reading of the diary is not a public disclosure. Under those
circumstances the preemption appears to be unfair in denying the
creator a remedy although from the prior discussion it is doubtful
whether the common law would find that the author was damaged.
The "for profit" limitation raises the same objections for the owner
of the unpublished work as does the fair use limitation. The nonprofit
04 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964).
65 1961 Report 40. But see Drone, Copyright 100 (1897), which states that "the
common law property in a literary composition is violated by any unauthorized public
use of it .... " (Emphasis added.)
00 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 106(a) (4), 109 (1965). The bill drops
the "for profit" limitation and substitutes in § 109 a number of specific instances which
are not infringements. These instances roughly coincide with the current interpretations
of the limitation.
7 Prosser, Torts 834-37 (3d ed. 1964).
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use may deprive the author of his private works, and he would not
have a remedy for invasion of privacy unless there was a public dis-
closure. Under section 109, however, it appears that there must be a
public disclosure to even qualify for the "for profit" exemption and, if
that is the construction of that section, then the creator would have
the opportunity to raise his privacy objection in all cases in which
the exemption is asserted.
Compulsory License
Statutory copyright requires a compulsory license for the right to
record." Although this limitation does not apply to the common law
copyright, the distinction is meaningless since a sale of the record con-
stitutes a publication which divests the owner of his copyright.69 The
preemption, therefore, will have no effect in this area.
Dual Rights
Both statutory and common law copyright recognize a dual nature
in rights for the intellectual creation. First, there is the intangible in-
corporeal copyright which permits the owner to control publication,
vending, copying, and other exclusive rights. Secondly, there is a
property right in the thing itself which has been created and which
inheres only in the tangible characteristics of the work and is like
ownership of any personal property.70 Preemption may produce a sub-
stantive change in some of the areas involving this dual right.
Executions and Creditor's Bills
One area where the dual right plays an important role is executions
and creditor's bills. The statutory and common law copyrights are not
subject to levy and execution because the property is intangible, in-
corporeal, and does not have a situs in any particular state so as to
subject it to the jurisdiction of a court." It has even been held that
the tangible object associated with the common law copyright is not
subject to execution.72
68 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964).
69 Nimmer, Copyright 456 (1964).
70 Ball, Copyright and Literary Property 54 (1944).
71 Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447 (1854); Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 447 (1852);
Harper & Bros. v. M. A. Donohue Co., 144 Fed. 491, 492 (C.C.Nf.D. Ill. 1905).
72 Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. 967 (No. 1076) (C.C.D. Ohio 1849); Dart v.
Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399 (1879). The Dart case involved an abstract book and the court
inferentially held that the object itself was valueless unless published, and to publish the
article was to exercise the copyright which the creditor would not acquire on execution.
This would amount to an infringement. As applied to abstract books, however, this
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A creditor's bill has been permitted to subject a patent to the
satisfaction of a judgment; 73 the Court reasoned that equity has in
personam jurisdiction which eliminates the problem of situs since that
is a requirement only for executions at law. Because of the similarity
between patents and copyrights, the holding of the Court is equally
applicable to copyright and, therefore, the intangible statutory right
should be subject to a creditor's bill. If the common law copyright
were subjected to a creditor's bill, the purchaser at the forced sale
would not be able to publish the article unless he had access to the tan-
gible object to copy. If, however, the copyright owner does have access
then the author could be deprived of his privacy by the reproduction
of diaries or letters.
With the preemption of common law copyright, unpublished works
are purportedly subject to a creditor's bill under section 201(d) (1)
which states that "the ownership of a copyright may be transferred...
by operation of law.. . ." Such a provision would be subject to abuse
if it were not for the savings provision of section 301 (b) (3) which per-
mits a cause of action for invasion of privacy. This latter provision
is a safeguard to any possible abuse.
Mortgages
Another area where the law is apt to be changed by preemption
relates to mortgages. At common law there could not be a chattel
mortgage on a copyright. 4 Since the "copyright does not attach to the
copyrightable object, but is distinct from it, the right was too ephem-
eral to be the object of possession and transfer." 75 As a result of
legislation in several states it is now possible to obtain a security
device on the unpublished literary property either by mortgage or
hypothecation.7 1
A statutory copyright, on the contrary, can be mortgaged by an
express provision,7 but can be foreclosed only in a state court because
rationale has been rejected. Washington Bank v. Fidelity Abstract & Security Co., 5 Wash.
487, 46 Pac. 1036 (1896); Leon Loan & Abstract Co. v. Equalization Bd., 86 Iowa 127, 53
N.W. 94 (1892). Even the Michigan Legislature subsequently overruled the Dart case.
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.6017 (1962). The Dart rationale, however, may be applicable to
other copyright objects such as diaries, letters, and manuscripts where a valid privacy
contention might be raised.
73 Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126 (1881).
74 Nimmer, Copyright § 121.2 (1964).
75 Security-First Natl Bank v. Republic Pictures Corp., 97 F. Supp. 360, 368
(S.D. Cal. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952).
76 Miller, "Problems in the Transfer of Interests in a Copyright," ASCAP, Tenth
Copyright Law Symposium 131, 132 (1959).
77 17 US.C. § 28 (1964).
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of the absence of a federal question for jurisdiction.7 Although there
is an issue whether the state courts will foreclose such a mortgage79
it has been suggested that the desired result can be achieved by hy-
pothecation which is the pledging of the copyright without giving the
pledgee possession. 0
Under section 201 (d) the unpublished work could be mortgaged
under the federal statute. Foreclosure proceedings would, however,
have to be taken in the state courts and the inconsistencies resulting
from the choice of law and conflicts between the states would still be
prevalent." It would seem that if one of the primary purposes behind
preemption is the adoption of a single uniform system, jurisdiction to
foreclose would be granted to the federal courts. In light of this policy
the courts may overrule Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l
Bank' which is the only case holding that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction.
Assignments
The common law copyright can be assigned or licensed orally
under the rules of personal property.8 3 Statutory copyright, however,
requires the formality of a writing in order to assign, grant, or mort-
gage,84 although it has been suggested that a copyright license, as dis-
tinguished from an assignment, may be oral. 85 Since there are dual
rights, a transfer of the copyrighted object does not transfer the statu-
tory copyright unless there is consent or intent to pass those rights, and
an assignment of the copyright does not transfer the tangible object.8 6
The preemption of common law copyright will require that all
transfers of copyright be in writing under section 204(a). Although
this imposes an added obligation on the common law copyright owner,
it eliminates a much criticized result. At common law there has arisen
a presumption that a transfer of the tangible object also passes the
78 Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
1952).
79 Ibid.
80 Nimmer, Copyright § 121.2 (1964).
81 Miller, supra note 76, at 147 n.67.
82 Supra note 78. This case has been criticized because it leaves foreclosure to the
inharmonious confficts and vagaries of state enforcement and may impair the security
value of copyright. Miller, supra note 76, at 147 n.67. See also Kaplan, "Literary and
Artistic Property (Including Copyright) as Security: Problems Facing the Lender," 19
Law and Contemporary Problems 254, 269-73 (1954).
83 Nimmer, Copyright § 120.1 (1964); Well, op. cit. supra note 10, at 116-17. See
Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 658 (1888) ; Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872).
84 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1964).
85 Nimmer, Copyright § 120.2 (1964).
86 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1964).
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literary rights unless they are specifically reserved. 7 The requirement
of a writing eliminates this presumption of transfer.88
Constitutional Questions
The main thrust of preemption is to eliminate the duration prob-
lem of common law copyright. This necessarily raises a constitutional
issue since a limited term will be substituted for a perpetual term and
the substituted rights, therefore, will not be as exclusive as the common
law rights. This, it is argued, is a deprivation of property without due
process of law. On the other hand, it is argued that the substituted
rights are practically equivalent to common law rights and, therefore,
it is not an unreasonable deprivation.
Although statutory copyright will impose limits on the duration of
rights, it will provide certain advantages. Registration under the statute
will provide a date of creation which will be prima facie valid. This will
make proof of infringement easier. At common law, damages are
usually limited to the value of the property appropriated unless malice
is shown and then exemplary damages can be recovered. 9 Statutory
copyright, however, will permit a choice between actual damages and
profits or a minimum recovery according to a statutory schedule in lieu
of actual damagesY0 A discretionary award of costs and attorney's fees
may also be permitted for the prevailing party.9 1 The statutory copy-
right also provides constructive notice to any future infringer and pro-
tects the copyright owner by eliminating, to a certain extent, accidental
infringement. Statutory copyright has an even greater advantage since
it prevents a loss of rights through an inadvertent publication which is
always a threat to the common law copyright. The bill further attempts
to meet the problems of duration by increasing the term of copyright
to the life of the author plus fifty years.2 The owner of the unpublished
work does not have to comply with any formalities or affirmative ob-
ligations such as notice,93 deposit,94 or registration 95 in order to secure
copyright protection. Registration, however, is a prerequisite to an in-
fringement suit 8 and the work must have been registered before the
87 Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942).
88 1965 Report 71.
89 Nimmer, Copyright 150 (1964).
90 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 504 (1965).
91 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 505 (1965).
92 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1965).
03 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1965).
94 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 406 (1965).
95 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 407 (1965).
96 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 410 (1965).
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infringement in order to be awarded statutory damages and attor-
ney's fees. 7
Even if the different rights have not been equalized by the bill, the
preemption can still be constitutional. Article one, section eight of the
Constitution permits Congress to secure all writings of the author and
this is not limited to published works. The common law rights are then
within the purview of the congressional power and are a privilege
rather than a vested right,98 granted by the silence of Congress and
capable of being recalled.
CONCLUSION
The common law copyright has for too long a time been the
"Cinderella" of the federal copyright law. Its scope of protection has
been widened due to an obsolete definition of publication and its effects
have been felt in the inconsistent approaches to enforcement. Uni-
formity and limitations on the exclusive rights of common law copy-
right demand preemption as no other alternative capable of solving this
maze of problems exists.
The harmful effects of preemption, however, have been minimized
by the preservation of a right of action for invasion of privacy and by
the lengthening of the statutory term of protection. Beneficial effects
such as statutory damages more than compensate the owner of the un-
published work for any limitation on his exclusive rights. Preemption
may not be a panacea but it is certainly a needed injection for the
current dichotomic system.
Rex D. Throckmorton
97 S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 411 (1965).
98 Sargoy, supra note 25, at 20.
